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Abstract 
 
We show that previous results suggesting that government ownership of banks has a 
negative effect on economic growth are not robust to adding more „fundamental‟ 
determinants of economic growth, such as institutions.  We also present regression 
results from a more recent period (1995-2007) which suggest that, if anything, 
government ownership of banks has been associated with higher long run growth 
rates, even after controlling for institutions and other variables suggested by the 
growth literature.  Drawing on the current global financial crisis, we provide a 
conceptual framework which explains why under certain circumstances government 
owned banks could have a greater effect on economic growth than privately-owned 
banks. 
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1. Introduction 
In their attempt to prevent financial meltdown in the autumn of 2008, governments in 
many industrialised countries took large stakes in major commercial banks.  While 
many countries in continental Europe, including Germany and France, have had a fair 
amount of experience with government owned banks, the UK and the US have found 
themselves in unfamiliar territory.  It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that there is 
deeply ingrained hostility in these countries towards the notion that governments can 
run banks effectively.
1
 We argue in this paper that such views are not supported by 
the empirical evidence. Our findings which utilise a variety of cross-country datasets 
suggest that, if anything, government ownership of banks has, on average, had a 
positive influence on economic growth.      
 
Hostility towards government owned banks reflects the hypothesis – known as the 
„political view of state banks‟ – that these banks are established by politicians who 
use them to shore up their power by instructing them to lend to political supporters 
and state-owned enterprises.  In return, politicians receive votes and other favours.  
This hypothesis also postulates that politically motivated banks make bad lending 
decisions, resulting in non-performing loans, financial fragility and slower growth. 
The political view of state banks was purportedly backed by empirical evidence in a 
paper by La Porta et al (2002) – henceforth LLS – which utilises cross-country 
regressions that uncover a negative association between government ownership of 
banks and average growth rates.  LLS predict a 0.23 percentage point increase in the 
annual long run growth rate for every reduction in government ownership of banks by 
10 percentage points, which is a very sizeable effect. These econometric findings have 
been used by the Bretton Woods institutions to back calls for privatising banks in 
developing countries (see, for example, World Bank, 2001).
2
 
 
As a first step in our argument, we show in this paper that the LLS results are fragile 
to extending the set of conditioning variables to include more „fundamental‟ 
determinants of economic growth such as institutions (e.g. Acemoglu et al 2005), 
which previous empirical literature has found to be significant (e.g. Knack and 
Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Rodrik et al, 2004; 
Demetriades and Law, 2006).  Specifically, we show that the coefficient of 
government ownership of banks becomes insignificant as soon as one such variable is 
introduced; moreover, we show that the econometrically preferred model specification 
excludes government ownership of banks. As a second step, we address head on the 
issue of whether government ownership of banks really reduces average growth rates 
by providing new empirical evidence from cross-country regressions that utilise a 
variety of more recent datasets. Our findings suggest that, if anything, government 
ownership of banks has had a robust positive and significant effect on long-run 
                                                 
1
 See for example the article by Martin Wolf in the 16
th
 October 2008 edition of The Financial Times  
which aptly summarises these views in its conclusion: "…Crisis-prone private banking is bad; state 
monopoly banking is still worse." 
2
 World Bank (2001) elaborates on the LLS results as follows: “…the fitted regression line suggests 
that had the share of government ownership in Bangladesh been at the sample mean (57 percent) 
throughout the period from 1970 instead of at 100 percent, annual average growth would have risen by 
about 1.4 percent, cumulating to a standard of living more than 50 percent higher than it is today.” (p. 
127). 
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growth rates, even after controlling for institutions.  The third step in our analysis 
draws on previous literature as well as on the current financial crisis to provide a 
rationale for these results.  
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides some additional background 
for the current investigation by outlining our own previous contribution to the same 
topic, which provides evidence which suggests that the real reasons for the 
widespread government ownership of banks are not political but weaknesses in 
regulation and contract enforcement. Section 3 presents the various data sets we 
utilise and their sources.  Section 4 presents our empirical results.  Section 5 provides 
a conceptual framework which explains why government ownership of banks can 
have positive effects on growth.  Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Additional Background   
In a precursor to this paper (Andrianova et al, 2008) we conclude that simple 
correlations between government ownership of banks and various macroeconomic 
aggregates need to be interpreted with caution, since they may reflect a common 
driving force. Specifically, we argue that government ownership of banks is, if 
anything, the result of institutional weaknesses rather than the desire of politicians to 
control banks. Using the circular city model of banking, we show that depositors 
prefer government banks to privately-owned banks when a fraction of the latter 
behave opportunistically and when deposit contract enforcement is weak.  For a wide 
range of parameters, the share of deposits in government owned banks declines with 
better institutions and a lower fraction of opportunists in banking.  We also show that 
there is a „low equilibrium‟ region, where opportunism is rife and institutions 
sufficiently weak, in which depositors will not choose private banks at all; privatising 
government owned banks in this region can only result in financial disintermediation, 
which cannot be good for growth.   
 
In Andrianova et al (2008) we also provide cross-country evidence which suggests 
that institutional factors are indeed the main statistically significant determinants of 
the share of government owned banks, while political or historical factors are not 
significant.  Specifically, we show that regulatory quality or rule of law and disclosure 
– used as proxies for contract enforcement and the proportion of opportunistic banks - 
are both statistically significant determinants of the degree of government ownership 
in banking. Moreover, we also show that prior banking crises increase the degree of 
government ownership in banking, which tallies well with the theoretical case of 
multiple equilibria driven by depositor beliefs.  Thus, much like in the current crisis, 
the positive association between government ownership of banks and financial crises 
in cross-country regressions is not a causal one: if governments take over failed 
private banks, it does not follow that governments cause financial instability.    
 
In Andrianova et al (2008), we did not, however, address the question – which should 
now be uppermost in the minds of policy makers worldwide – of what are the 
consequences of government owned banks on long run growth.  This is precisely the 
focus of the current paper.  
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3. Data and Sources 
For the first set of regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2 we use the original database 
from LLS.  We reproduce results from Table V and Table VI in LLS in the first 
column of each of these Tables. We then add two additional conditioning variables 
from the LLS database, which capture “institutional quality”: the index measuring 
bureaucratic quality and its insulation from political intervention (bqualitt) and the 
index of property rights (prop_hf9), which measures how well private property rights 
are protected.  
 
For the second set of estimations reported in Tables 3 and 4 we utilise annual GDP 
growth, GDP per capita and inflation rates from the World Economic Outlook 
database. Annual GDP per capita growth (in 2005 US$) is from the ERS.  Data on 
institutional quality are from the Kaufmann et al (2005) Quality of Governance 
dataset.  We create an average variable for each institutional quality variable from all 
the available databases spanning 1998-2005. Both transition economies and many oil 
exporting countries have seen above average growth during the period. We therefore 
include two dummy variables in the regressions. The first is a “transition dummy” for 
all former members of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics.  The second 
is a dummy for all non-OPEC net oil exporters, constructed from data on annual 
imports and exports of oil from the CIA World Factbook 2008.  This is to control for 
countries which have grown fast after their transitional recessions or on the basis of 
oil exploitation over the period, regardless of economic instability, institutional 
quality or regulatory structures. 
 
The government ownership of banks variables are from the various World Bank 
datasets on banking regulation and financial structure (Caprio, Levine and Barth 2008 
– henceforth, CLB).  They measure the “percentage of (the) banking system‟s assets 
in banks that are 50% or more owned by government”.  The data are available for 
1999, 2001 and 2005. We also include the LLS variable for government ownership of 
banks in 1995 (with state ownership at 50% for compatibility) for robustness checks. 
Correlation between the CLB 2001 and 2005 variables is high (.866) and the 
correlation between the CLB 1999 and 2001 observations slightly lower (0.721). The 
correlation between the LLS 1995 variable and the CLB 2001 and 2005 variable is 
0.654 and 0.572 respectively. Data availability is best in the 2001 dataset with 134 
observations, compared to 110 in 2005, 103 in 1999 and 92 in the LLS dataset.  
 
The LLS regressions include a variable for the average years of secondary schooling 
in the labour force. We collect data on educational attainment from the World 
Development Report, which records the percentage of the labour force with at least 
secondary education.  We use the first available entry for secondary and tertiary 
education between 1995 and 2007 to maximise data availability. The series is highly 
correlated with the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset on the average number of years of 
schooling. For both variables the number of observations for the final regression 
specification is low (80 observations or below) and there are no statistically 
significant effects for the education variable. The results reported below therefore 
mostly exclude this variable.  
 
More details on the variables we utilise and their sources are provided in the Data 
Appendix. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Re-examining the LLS results for omitted variable bias 
Table 1 presents four models based on Table V in the LLS paper. Model Ia is one of 
the original LLS regressions used as a comparison. Models Ib and Ic include 
bureaucratic quality and the index of property rights, respectively, to capture the 
quality of institutions, which were omitted in the LLS regressions. Including 
institutional quality variables consistently weakens the statistical significance of the 
government ownership variable (gbbp_70, henceforth GB70).  Specifically, the 
inclusion of bureaucratic quality in Model Ib, reduces the statistical significance of 
this variable from 1% in the corresponding LLS regression to 10%.  The inclusion of 
the property rights index in Model Ic renders GB70 insignificant, even at the 10% 
level. Instead, institutional quality is shown to make a positive and statistically 
significant contribution to average growth.  Models Ic and Id, which exclude the 
government ownership variable but include institutional variables in their place, have 
a higher R-square than the LLS model and the same number of variables. The model 
specification including institutional variables is therefore econometrically preferred to 
the original LLS specification. The result that institutional variables undermine the 
effect of GB70 is robust to using a variety of alternative institutional indicators, 
though property rights and bureaucratic quality are the most consistently significant 
variables. 
 
Table 2 is based on Table VI in the LLS paper. These regressions included a dummy 
for high inflation countries and variables measuring financial sector development at 
the beginning of the period. Including the latter variables probably captures some 
aspect of initial institutional quality and their inclusion therefore undermines the 
significance of GB70, even in the original LLS regression shown in the first column 
of Table 2. As can be seen, the significance level of GB70 drops to 9%.
3
  Including 
either of the two institutional quality indicators improves the explanatory power of the 
regression and renders GB70 insignificant.  Model IIa has a better fit than Model IIb, 
reflecting the higher level of statistical significance of bureaucratic quality. The 
property rights indicator in Model IIb is significant but only at the 10% level. 
Excluding GB70 (Models IIc and IId) and including instead the two institutional 
quality indicators again improves the R-square vis-à-vis the LLS model.  
Interestingly, in Model IId, the property rights index is significant at the 1% level, 
which suggests that its near insignificance in Model IIb could be due to the 
collinearity between this variable and GB70.  
 
To summarise, government ownership of banking in LLS had a negative and almost 
always statistically significant coefficient in the published model specifications. 
                                                 
3
 In addition the LLS results are fragile in other dimensions.  Specifically, they rely on the presence of 
insignificant regional dummies.  If these dummies are removed from the regression (leaving only the 
African dummy which is significant), statistical significance of the state ownership variable is lost. 
Furthermore, the LLS results rely on a non-standard measure of GDP growth (growthff), which appears 
to utilise some of their own data (defined as "GDPpcGth (Levine+own) excl.breaku").  If the 
alternative variable in the dataset measuring GNP per capita (gnpcagav) - obtained from World 
Development Indicators - is used the coefficient on the gbbp_70 variables becomes statistically 
insignificant in model specifications, irrespective of whether the regional dummies are included or 
excluded.   
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However, these models excluded institutional quality indicators which are widely 
considered the more fundamental determinants of long run growth.  As we argued in 
Andrianova et al (2008), government ownership of banks is the symptom of weak 
institutions.  If institutional quality is omitted from growth regressions, government 
ownership acts as a proxy for the missing fundamental variable.  This explains the 
LLS results.  Once, however, institutional quality indicators are added alongside 
government ownership of banking, government ownership of banks is no longer 
significant and the main LLS finding disappears.  “Governance” matters, while bank 
ownership does not.  The widely publicised negative effect of government ownership 
of banks was clearly the result of omitted variable bias, rather than the true effect of 
government owned banks on the long-run average growth rate.  
 
 
4.2 The Effect of Government Ownership on Growth in Recent Years 
Table 3 shows the regression results using the data set we compiled, which contains 
data from 1995 onwards. To maximise the number of observations we used the CLB 
2001 variable as our measure for state ownership of banking. Average GDP growth is 
either from 2000-2007 or from 1995-2007. We include the log of initial GDP per 
capita to capture convergence. We also control for whether a country was in economic 
“transition” or exporting oil during the period and include a measure of average 
inflation between 1995 and 2005 as a control for macro-economic stability. All the 
controls have the expected effects, with richer countries growing more slowly than 
poorer countries and transition countries and oil exporters experiencing fast growth. 
The inflation measure is not statistically significant over this time period, probably 
reflecting that transition countries have grown fast even if monetary stabilisation was 
delayed. The regulatory quality variable from the Kaufmann database also has the 
expected positive effect and is always statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Interestingly in all these models the effect of the state-ownership of banks variable is 
now positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, both for the 1995-2007 and 
2000-2007 periods (Models III and IV). It appears that in recent years state-ownership 
of banks was, on average, helpful in enabling countries to take advantage of long-run 
growth opportunities. We conducted a large number of robustness checks for this 
somewhat surprising result. Model V uses GDP growth instead of GDP per capita 
growth as the dependent variable with the same result.
4
 Model VI includes the 
measure of educational attainment. This weakens the significance of the state 
ownership variable, but on further examination this is entirely due to patchy 
availability of education data in less developed countries.
5
 Sample selection therefore 
matters and a bias against including LDCs in the sample weakens our result. We 
return to this issue in more detail in section 4.3 below. Model VII includes an 
indicator of financial development (liquid liabilities / GDP, similar results are 
obtained with other financial development indicators). Again the sample excludes a 
number of fast-growing LDCs and the size of the coefficient is reduced, but the 
overall result of a positive and significant association of state-ownership of banks 
with faster growth is preserved.  
 
                                                 
4
 Note that the LLS results were highly sensitive to the choice of the dependent variable. 
5
 The coefficient and the significance level of the state ownership variable in the regressions of the 80 
countries for which education data are available are almost the same whether or not educational 
attainment is included. 
7 
 
The results are also robust to using the LLS 1995 or the CLB 2005 data on state 
ownership (significance of the state ownership variable remains at the 1% level 
despite smaller data-sets of 88 and 100 observations respectively). We have also 
checked that the results are not driven by a few outliers with unusually fast growth. 
All reported models exclude China. The results remain robust when we remove India 
or the top ten or fifteen fastest growing countries from the specification - only the size 
of the coefficient on the state ownership variable changes.  Both the “rule of law” and 
the “corruption” indices from the Kaufmann governance dataset can be used instead 
of regulatory quality and are positive and significant at the 1% level over the 1995-
2007 time period. The positive and highly significant effects of government 
ownership of banks and of “governance” on economic growth are thus robust in a 
large variety of model specifications.  
 
4.3 The Effect of Government Ownership on Growth in LDCs 
Table 4 directly examines the claim that government ownership of banks is 
particularly damaging in countries with low levels of income and property rights. The 
first two columns in the Table (LLS Model and Model VIII) use the LLS dataset and 
show that in the original LLS specification the effect of government ownership is 
barely significant at the 10% level when the regression is restricted to the lower half 
of the distribution in the sample in terms of the initial per capita GDP level.  The 
coefficient on state ownership of banks is marginally higher than in the full sample 
but it is not statistically different.
6
  Again, adding bureaucratic quality improves the fit 
of the regression and completely undermines the significance of the “state owned 
banks” variable (Model VIII). In the new dataset there is evidence that government 
ownership may in fact be particularly beneficial in low income countries. For 
countries with low GDP per capita the effect of government ownership is positive and 
significant, with a larger coefficient than in the whole sample. The lower the threshold 
we set for the sample of low income countries, the higher the coefficient (Models IXa 
and IXb).  
 
4.4 Discussion  
Our findings suggest that in recent years government ownership of banks has had, if 
anything, positive effects on long run growth.  This is, of course, a surprising result, 
especially in the light of the widespread belief – typically supported by anecdotal 
evidence – that “…bureaucrats are generally bad bankers” (See, for example, World 
Bank, 2001 p. 127). Our results, however, should be interpreted with caution.  They 
suggest that this result is valid on average and during a rather short, albeit recent, 
period.  Average results do of course mask a lot of individual variation and do not rule 
out the possibility that a lot of government bureaucrats are indeed bad bankers.  
However, our results do suggest that the anecdotal evidence alluded to by World Bank 
(2001) and others cannot easily be generalised.  Indeed, our findings suggest that 
government banks in recent years have been, on balance and on average, better banks 
than private banks in terms of promoting long run growth. The next question that 
needs to be answered is why this has been the case.  This is addressed in the next 
section. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 If the alternative growth variable from the World Bank dataset measuring GNP per capita (gnpcagav) 
is used instead of growthff  the coefficient on the gbbp_70 variables is lower and not statistically 
significant (t-ratio = -0.72).  
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5. Government Ownership of Banks and Economic Growth: 
Conceptual Issues 
There are numerous well known market failures in banking which, by themselves, can 
justify a significant role for various forms of government intervention, including 
financial regulation and interest rate controls (see, for example, Stiglitz, 1993).  The 
need for central banks to provide lender of last resort services, the need for deposit 
insurance to prevent bank runs and the need for financial regulation to lessen adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems are, of course, widely accepted (see, for 
example, Goodhart 1995 and Goodhart 1988).  Most of these market failures can be 
attributed to asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, including 
importantly the informational asymmetry that exists between a bank and its creditors, 
be they depositors or other banks. The nature of bank balance sheets magnifies the 
impact of liquidity shocks affecting individual banks and could generate external 
effects on other banks and the rest of the economy. With confidence evaporating from 
the financial system, the credit channel and the payments system freeze up and the 
real economy grinds to a halt.  The combination of deposit insurance, lender of last 
resort and financial regulation is intended to address these market failures by helping 
to ensure that depositors are protected, if not fully informed about bank balance 
sheets, and banks remain sound and solvent.  All this could work well in theory to 
address market failures or limit their impact, but the recent global financial crisis has 
demonstrated that there exist additional market failures in private banking that 
provide scope for an even wider role for government.  These could also be partly, if 
not wholly, attributed to imperfect information, since they include agency problems 
within banks and the capture of regulators by the regulated.  We argue that these 
massive failures provide a rationale for why private banks may have performed badly 
in terms of promoting growth in recent years. 
 
It is, of course, well known that in any organisation there are principal-agent 
problems. Our conjecture is that „high-tech‟ banking, which involves the creation of 
new complex and opaque financial products, exacerbates any such problems within 
privately owned banks. Specifically, it has widened the wedge that already exists 
between the management of a corporation and its shareholders because the risks 
involved in complex new financial products are not well understood. Financial 
innovation could therefore be seen as having provided an unfair advantage for bank 
insiders: they could make unfair bets using shareholders‟ – and even depositors‟ – 
money (“heads we win, tails you lose”).  If known, the existence of unfair bets within 
banks is likely to result in adverse selection in senior jobs within private banks: 
opportunists who are in search of quick enrichment will be more likely to apply for 
such jobs.
7
  „High-tech‟ banking and the speculative activities with which it was 
associated could be one of the reasons why private banks may have diverted their 
attention from growth enhancing activities in recent years. The business of packaging 
and re-packaging sub-prime mortgage loans into derivatives of various shapes and 
forms could hardly be considered growth-promoting; other than an asset price bubble 
and the roots of a deep recession, it seems to have promoted little else.  From a 
macroeconomic perspective, the lucrative reward structures of „high-tech‟ banking 
may have also distorted the allocation of human capital, thereby resulting in a large 
social cost.  Specifically, the very high financial rewards associated with „high-tech‟ 
                                                 
7
 It is debatable whether this has been the case in the current crisis although anecdotal evidence 
suggests that chief executives of large international banks may have knowingly taken excessive risks. 
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banking appear to have diverted large numbers of talented university graduates, 
including scientists and engineers, away from productive occupations and into 
speculation.  
 
How about financial regulation? Regulation is intended to contain excessive risk 
taking by banks. In the last twenty years or so, the Basle approach towards financial 
regulation has focussed the emphasis almost exclusively on capital adequacy.  The 
implicit assumption has been that all that needs to be done for banks to avoid 
excessive risk is to raise „adequate‟ capital from shareholders for the risks they are 
taking. Large international banks have, however, been left alone to measure risk of 
their on and off balance sheet activities using their own risk models and ratings 
supplied by credit rating agencies.  Regulators are expected to simply review these 
models instead of examining the quality of bank assets, whether on or off the balance 
sheet.  There has been no attempt to regulate credit rating agencies, which are now 
known to have had incestuous relationships with the banking industry. There has been 
little, if any emphasis, on addressing corporate governance issues within banks other 
than on avoiding the lone insider type of operational risk (known as the „Nick Leeson- 
Barings‟ problem). Little, if anything, has been said about how the Basle II process 
could contain extreme moral hazard by insiders of the type we have witnessed 
recently in large international banks. Indeed, this is perhaps not at all surprising since 
the Basle II process was to a large extent captured by the large international banks 
(see, for example, Claessens, Underhill and Zhang, 2008).  The process has implicitly 
assumed that a bank‟s management is above suspicion – no moral hazard needs to be 
contained here.  Regulatory capture in financial markets has rendered banking 
regulation and supervision ineffective.
8
 When an industry is busy promoting the short-
term interests of insiders, promoting long-term economic growth will be the least of 
its concerns.  
 
What about government owned banks? Our conjecture is that such banks are less 
prone to extreme moral hazard problems, especially in democracies. The standard 
moral hazard problems in private banking become extreme due to (i) remuneration 
structures that reward excessive risk-taking, (ii) punishments incommensurate with 
the crime and (iii) opaqueness of the environment in which financial innovation is 
rife. In each of these three factors government owned banks are likely to fare better 
than private owned banks. The reward structures in government owned banks are not 
as attractive for insiders as they have been in large international banks.  Could 
government owned banks be corrupt?  Indeed, they could, but there is a limit to what 
corrupt bank officials can get away with in countries where politicians are 
accountable to the electorate.  Corruption, when uncovered, tends to have significant 
political costs, hence it is in the interest of politicians who want to be re-elected to 
contain it. Punishments for excessive risk taking in a private bank even in a 
democracy tend to be limited, as highlighted by recent experience: witness the recent 
high-profiled example of an unjustifiably high pension for a chief executive directly 
responsible for the largest fall in profits in British corporate history of a major 
privately owned international bank.
9
 The combination of high rewards in good times 
                                                 
8
 See Johnson (2009) for an excellent and vivid account of the ways in which the American financial 
industry gained political power and was able to dictate not only a weak regulatory environment but also 
massive bailout subsidies, which were often less than transparent.     
9
 See the Financial Times article on January 19
th
 2009 “RBS set to reveal biggest loss in British 
corporate history”.  
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and lax or absent punishment in bad times is much more likely to attract opportunists 
to run a private owned bank. Additionally, government owned banks tend to be a lot 
more constrained – in some sense less innovative – in the type of assets they can 
invest, which limits the scope for excessive risk taking. Frequently, they have 
developmental objectives and their investments may have social benefits that are not 
directly reflected in their profitability of their loans but may, nevertheless, generate 
positive spillovers on other companies.
10
  Political priorities in banking, if they are the 
outcome of a democratic political process are more likely to be growth enhancing 
than the priorities of opportunistic bankers whose objective is their own quick 
enrichment.   
 
To conclude, uncontained extreme moral hazard, resulting in a failure of corporate 
governance within private banks, provides a relatively new rationale as to why such 
banks may not promote economic growth as effectively as government owned banks. 
We do not claim that this is a completely new explanation of this phenomenon 
because, broadly speaking, it is one of the reasons why policy makers in the 
developing world have traditionally been sceptical about bank privatisation. For 
instance, the banking crises experienced in Latin America in the 1980s have been 
ascribed, at least partially, to excessive risk taking by newly privatised banks in a 
financially liberalised environment (See, for example, Diaz Alejandro, 1985, or 
Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990).
11
  
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
We have provided new evidence which suggests that the view that government 
ownership of banks is harmful to economic growth is unjustified.  If anything, our 
findings suggest that government ownership of banks has had positive effects on long-
run economic growth.  We have argued that besides the well known externalities and 
other market failures that provide a rationale for government intervention in the 
financial system, the recent global financial crisis has added a new one.  Specifically, 
unchecked extreme moral hazard behaviour by opportunistic bank insiders poses an 
extreme, yet real, threat to the growth promoting role of banks.  Such behaviour 
diverts bank resources towards short-term enrichment of insiders at the expense of 
maximising shareholder wealth and may also be responsible for the misallocation of 
human capital by attracting talented individuals to unproductive speculative activities.  
Our findings suggest that even in the 21
st
 century, government owned banks can 
continue to play a “developmental” role, not only in developing but also in 
industrialised countries by containing extreme moral hazard behaviours that have a 
capacity to undermine long term economic growth.    
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Data Appendix 
 
Variable Dates Number of 
Observa-
tions 
Definition / Source 
Average annual GDP 
per capita growth rate  
1995-2007 
2000-2007 
177 In 2005 US$  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/ 
Average annual GDP 
growth 
1995-2007 
2000-2007 
173 
177 
World Economic Outlook database 
Inflation average 1995-2005 177 World Economic Outlook database 
Initial GDP per capita 1999 177 World Economic Outlook database 
Initial GDP per capita 1995 173 In 2005 US$  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/ 
State owned banks 1995 92 Share of assets of the top ten banks controlled by the 
government at the 50% level: LLS dataset available from 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael. 
laporta/publications  
State owned banks 1999 
2001 
2005 
103 
134 
110 
“What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks 
that are 50% or more government owned as of yearend”  
Beck, T., Caprio, G and Levine, T. World Bank Research 
Databases: Bank Regulation and Supervision. Permanent 
URL: http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0 
1999 data from original database, 2001 data from 2003 
database; 2005 data from 2007 database 
Regulatory Quality  
(Rule of Law and 
Corruption for 
robustness checks) 
Average of 
1998, 2000, 
2002-2005 
185 Measures whether regulation aids the functioning of 
private markets (including banking supervision). It also 
measures whether the regulatory burden is perceived to be 
excessive, undermining private business. 
Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzzi, M: Governance matters 
IV : Governance indicators for 1996-2005  
Permanent URL: http://go.worldbank.org/V9IMLWZ4C1 
Secondary eduation First post 
1995 
observation  
95 Percentage of labour force with completed secondary 
education (% secondary education + % tertiary education) 
World Bank: World Development Indicators  
Financial Development 
Liquid liabilities / GDP 
1995 147 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, 
(2000), "A New Database on Financial Development and 
Structure," World Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605 
updated November 2008 
Non-OPEC oil 
exporters 
Mostly 
2005 
185 Own calculations: non-OPEC countries in which exports 
of oil exceed imports. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2176rank.html  
(accessed February 2009) 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2175rank.html  
(accessed February 2009) 
Transition countries 
dummy 
1988 185 Countries of the Former Soviet Union and the Central and 
Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact 
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Table 1 
 Robustness checks of results in LLS Table V “Simple Growth Regressions” 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of countries.  
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita for 1960-95.  
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
 LLS model LLS model  
with institutional variables 
Model  
with institutional variables 
  Ia Ib Ic Id 
GB70 [gbbp_70] –0.0199*** 
(0.0071) 
–0.0110*  
(0.0064) 
–0.0092 
(0.0066) 
  
Log of initial GDP per capita [logy60f] –0.0160*** 
(0.0033) 
–0.0187*** 
(0.0026) 
–0.0199*** 
(0.0034) 
–0.0180*** 
(0.0026) 
–0.0195*** 
(0.0034) 
Average years of schooling [ysch_av] 0.0061*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0037*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0036*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0013) 
Bureaucratic quality [bqualitt] omitted 0.0048*** 
(0.0010) 
 0.0054*** 
(0.0010) 
 
Property rights [prop_hf9] omitted  0.0104*** 
(0.0028) 
 0.0117*** 
(0.0028) 
Intercept 0.0911*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0857*** 
(0.0137) 
0.0791*** 
(0.0168) 
0.0726*** 
(0.0118) 
0.0678*** 
(0.0150) 
R
2
 0.3403 0.4751 0.4590 0.4545 0.4459 
Observations 85 84 83 84 83 
 
All variables are defined in La Porta et al (2002) and taken from La Porta et al database available at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html . 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 2 
Robustness checks of results in LLS Table VI “Growth Results with Different Combinations of Controls”. 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of countries.  
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita for 1960-95.  
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
 LLS model LLS model  
with institutional variables 
Model  
with institutional variables 
  IIa IIb IIc IId 
GB70 [gbbp_70] –0.0152* 
(0.0091) 
–0.0052 
(0.0085) 
–0.0067 
(0.0082) 
  
High inflation dummy [infl_d20] –0.0073 
(0.0070) 
–0.0073 
(0.0062) 
–0.0076 
(0.0066) 
–0.0093* 
(0.0050) 
–0.0103* 
(0.0056) 
Latitude [lat_abst] –0.0039 
(0.0184) 
–0.0039 
(0.0168) 
0.0076 
(0.0165) 
–0.0069 
(0.0176) 
0.0045 
(0.0169) 
Log of initial GDP per capita [logy60f] –0.0157*** 
(0.0042) 
–0.0179*** 
(0.0034) 
–0.0192*** 
(0.0044) 
–0.0178*** 
(0.0034) 
–0.0193*** 
(0.0045) 
Private credit / GDP  in 1960 [prif_i60] 0.0217** 
(0.0102) 
0.0144* 
(0.0084) 
0.0197* 
(0.0103) 
0.0146* 
(0.0081) 
0.0202** 
(0.0100) 
Average years of schooling [ysch_av] 0.0044** 
(0.0018) 
0.0026 
(0.0016) 
0.0028 
(0.0020) 
0.0029* 
(0.0015) 
0.0032* 
(0.0019) 
Bureaucratic quality [bqualitt]      0.0050*** 
(0.0010) 
 0.0053*** 
(0.0011) 
 
Property rights [prop_hf9]   0.0084* 
(0.0031) 
 0.0092*** 
(0.0032) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1019*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0905*** 
(0.0174) 
0.0908*** 
(0.0206) 
0.0845*** 
(0.0155) 
0.0831*** 
(0.0178) 
R
2
 0.5012 0.6016 0.5751 0.5990 0.5709 
Observations 82 81 80 81 81 
All variables are defined in La Porta et al (2002) and taken from La Porta et al database available at  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html  
* denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Government Ownership and Growth in Recent Years. 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of countries. 
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP for 1995-2007 and 2000-2007. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
 
 
All variables are defined in the Data Appendix. 
 denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
Notes:  
1 
For the 2000-2007 regressions the base year is 1999 (WEO) and for 1995-2007 it is 1995 (ERS). 
2 
The inflation dummy used by LLS with inflation >20% is never significant. 
 Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
 Average GDP per 
capita growth 2000-
2007 
Average GDP per 
capita growth 1995-
2007 
Average GDP 
growth 
1995-2007 
Average GDP per 
capita growth 1995-
2007 
Average GDP per 
capita growth 1995-
2007 
State owned banks in 2001 3.6020*** 
(1.2581) 
3.1739*** 
(0.8689) 
2.3192*** 
(0.92) 
1.328*    
(.7472)      
2.2926*** 
(0.7915) 
Log of initial GDP per 
capita
1
 
-0.6087*** 
(0.2117) 
-0.4309*** 
(0.1727) 
-0.4476** 
(0.2172) 
-0.5308** 
(0.2481)     
-.5297*** 
(0.1637) 
Inflation average 95-05
2
 0.0186 
(0.0154) 
0.0012 
(0.0097) 
-0.0058 
(0.0131) 
-.0060  
(0.0076) 
-.0107 
(0.0117)    
Regulatory quality 1.4207*** 
(0.4134) 
1.1857*** 
(0.2996) 
0.6237* 
(0.3629)   
1.2303*** 
(0.4156) 
1.3529*** 
(0.3003)      
Non-OPEC Oil exporter 1.4124** 
0.6825 
0.911* 
(0.4936) 
0.8646** 
(0.4586) 
0.3137 
(0.47702) 
0.5674 
(0.4651) 
Transition countries dummy 4.058*** 
(0.8126) 
2.8508*** 
(0.5678) 
1.3867** 
(0.6128) 
2.6257*** 
(0.4321) 
2.8426*** 
(0.522) 
Secondary education    0.0014 
(0.0089) 
 
Liquid liabilities / GDP     -0.1253 
(0.3187)    
Intercept 5.9493*** 
(1.5882) 
4.8157*** 
(1.3974) 
6.9102*** 
(1.7642) 
5.8821*** 
(1.9683)     
5.8575*** 
(1.2662) 
R
2
 0.5474 0.4547 0.1981 0.4765 0.4469 
Observations 118 118 118 80 105 
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Table 4 
Government Ownership and Growth in LDCs. 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of countries.  
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Average annual per capita 
GDP growth rate over 1965-95 
Average annual per capita GDP   
growth rate over 1995-07 
 LLS Model 
1960 GDP  
per capita 
<270US$ 
Model VIII 
1960 GDP  
per capita 
<270US$ 
Model IXa 
1995 GDP  
per capita 
<US$6000 
Model IXb  
1995 GDP  
per capita 
<US$4000 
Independent variables     
State owned banks in 1970 –0.0239* 
(0.0142) 
–0.013  
(0.013) 
  
State owned banks in 2001   3.0587*** 
(0.9794) 
3.1498***    
(1.0651) 
Log of initial GDP per 
capita
1
 
–0.0169** 
(0.0079) 
–0.0163** 
(0.0074) 
–0.2627 
(0.2527) 
–0.1881   
(0.2943) 
Inflation average   0.0003  
(0.0100) 
0.0001    
(0.0105) 
Average years of schooling 0.0084*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0065*** 
(0.0021) 
  
Bureaucratic quality  0.0069*** 
(0.0017) 
  
Regulatory  quality   1.1278*** 
(0.4076) 
1.1289**     
(0.5337) 
Non-OPEC Oil exporters   1.0567 
 (0.6966) 
1.1013    
(0.8711)     
Transition countries dummy   3.0687*** 
(0.6705) 
3.0477*** 
(0.8676) 
Intercept 0.089*** 
(0.0431) 
0.0546 
(0.0420) 
3.5728* 
(1.9212) 
3.0749   
(2.1656) 
R
2
 0.3202 0.4827 0.4927 0.4634 
Observations 42 41 77 65 
All variables in LLS Model and Model VIII are defined in La Porta et al (2002) and taken from La 
Porta et al database available at  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html  
All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level.  
** denotes significance at the 5% level.  
*** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
Notes:  
1 
For the 1965-1995 regressions the base year is 1960 and for 1995-2007 it is 1995 
 
 
 
